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LAWYERS' IDENTITIES, CLIENT SELECTION 
AND THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
PRINCIPLE: THOUGHTS ON THE 
SANCTIONING OF 
JUDITH NATHANSON 
BRUCE K. MILLER* 
INTRODUCTION 
We lawyers disagree. We are, after all, schooled for conten-
tiousness, and many of us construct our professional identities pri-
marily through adversarial advocacy. That this advocacy is 
undertaken on behalf of clients and with the expectation of com-
pensation does not always drain it of intensely personal meaning. 
We frequently come to identify strongly with the interests of the 
clients we represent. For those of us who specialize, in criminal de-
fense, say, or in civil rights litigation, these interests can transcend 
the issues presented by any given matter for which we are retained, 
becoming both institutional and ideological. The frequency of jour-
nalists' solicitation of lawyers' views on issues of public concern is a 
result of this identification. Our opinions are sought less because 
we are lawyers than because of the political perspective we are 
(usually correctly) assumed to represent by virtue of the kind of 
lawyering we do. 
For some of us, this confluence of professional identity and 
personal belief is as much a cause as a consequence of the careers 
we pursue. If we entered law school after, say, 1960, it is likely that 
our decision to do so was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to 
do justice as we saw it. Lawyers such as Ruth Ginsburg, Thurgood 
Marshall and Leonard Weinglass, to name three eminent examples, 
were mentors to many of us, even if we never met them. And, 
though educational loans, the job market, and the twenty-eight 
years since Earl Warren's retirement have made compromisers of 
* Professor of law, Western New England College School of Law. Many Thanks 
to the editors of the Western New England Law Review for organizing this symposium 
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us all, it is fair to say that lawyers actively pursuing their own sense 
of justice have significantly shaped the positive law under which we 
live today. Nowhere is this influence more significant than in the 
widespread popular endorsement, reflected in statutory enactment, 
of the legitimacy of public efforts to eliminate many types of formal, 
status-based discrimination by both government and private com-
mercial enterprises. 
I. WHEN PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY CONFLICTS WITH THE 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE 
Typical of such efforts is the Massachusetts' Public Accommo-
dations Statute,l which prohibits many types of status discrimina-
tion in "any place[] of public accommodation." The Statute 
defines a place of public accommodation as "any place ... which is 
open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general pub-
lic,"2 and includes sex among the classes of prohibited discrimina-
tion.3 It would probably not surprise many of the lawyers who 
urged this deployment of state power to enforce the antidiscrimina-
tion principle to learn that their own law offices are considered 
places of public accommodation and that their decisions to refuse 
potential clients' requests for representation would fall within the 
Statute's purview. There is, nonetheless, some irony in Judith Na-
thanson's becoming the first Massachusetts lawyer to be sanctioned 
by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
("MCAD") for vioiating the antidiscrimination principle in her se-
lection of clients.4 · . 
Nathanson is a feminist, committed to using her lawyering 
skills to serve justice as she sees it. In her case, this commitment 
means that she seeks to "devote her expertise to eliminating gender 
bias in the court system."5 It is highly likely that Nathanson's par-
ticular blending of personal belief and professional identity makes 
her a strong supporter of the Massachusetts; Public Accommoda-
tion Statute, at least as it applies to sex discrimination, and proba-
bly with respect to the other forms of discrimination proscribed by 
the Statute as well. The irony is that it is precisely Nathanson's 
devotion to the eradication of gender bias that has triggered the 
1. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (1996). 
2. /d. § 92A. 
3. See id. § 98. 
4. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MeAD Feb. 25, 
1997). 
5. Id. at 40. 
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Commission's determination to sanction her. The Commission ob-
jects to Nathanson's declaration, prompted by her political values, 
that she is willing to represent only women in divorce cases. This 
decision, according to a hearing officer of the Commission, consti-
tutes unlawful discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of 
the Public Accommodations Statute.6 
Nathanson's articulation of her reasons for limiting her divorce 
practice to female clients offers a remarkable portrait of a lawyer 
who has fused her personal values and professional skills with deep 
integrity. In her testimony before the MCAD, she stated that in 
matters which do not involve controversies between men and wo-
men, she "has no ethical problem with representing men."7 In di-
vorce cases, however, she believes that the "issues that arise in 
representing wives ... differ from those involved in representing 
husbands. By example, she noted that wives' attorneys emphasize 
the value of homemaker services and the limited future earning po-
tential of homemakers re-entering the work force, while husbands' 
attorneys tend to minimize these issues."8 More fundamentally, 
Nathanson further testified that she 
needs to feel a personal commitment to her client's cause in or-
der to function effectively as an advocate, and that in family law 
she has only experienced this sense of personal commitment in 
representing women. She testified that her female divorce clients 
derive a specific benefit from her limited practice. They feel 
comfortable sharing their anxieties and concerns with an advo-
cate whom they trust to be wholeheartedly as well as intellectu-
ally committed to their interests. Nathanson believes that her 
practice of advancing arguments only on behalf of women en-
hanced her credibility with judges she appeared before in the 
family law courts.9 
If Nathanson's assessment of the impact of her choice is cor-
rect, it is noteworthy that the choice is not only essential to her 
personal integrity but that it also serves the most defining goal of 
our profession, the effective representation of clients. Nathanson's 
decision to represent only women in divorce cases can be seen as 
analogous to that of a labor lawyer to represent only unions (or 
management) or of a personal injury lawyer to work only on the 
6. See id. at 41. 
7. Id. at 40. 
8. /d. 
9. [d. 
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plaintiff's (or insurance defense) side. These latter divisions of pro-
fessional labor are, of course, commonplace and un controversiaL 
Still, the hearing officer's judgment that Nathanson's principle 
for selecting divorce clients was unlawful reflects an understandable 
reading of the Public Accommodations Statute. To draw distinc-
tions between workers and employers or between injured people 
and tortfeasors is not to engage in prohibited discrimination; to 
draw them between men and women is, at least presumptively dis-
criminatory. Further, as a partner in a law office that operates for 
profit and both provides a service to and solicits business from the 
general public, Nathanson appears to join most other lawyers (and 
other professionals) in private practice as a proprietor of a "place of 
public accommodation" within the Statute's meaning.1° Thus, un-
less a law office should be viewed differently from the office of a 
doctor or a dentist, thereby rendering lawyers "exempt from com-
pliance with the anti-discrimination laws of the Commonwealth 
with respect to selecting clients,"ll it is hard to avoid the hearing 
officer's conclusion that Nathanson's refusal to accept male divorce 
clients constitutes unlawful discrimination. 
II. JUDITH NATHANSON'S ASSOCIATIONAL VOICE 
Leora Harpaz's thoughtful article on the Nathanson matter ar-
gues that there are good reasons why a law office is different from 
that of a doctor or a dentist.12 These reasons may be found in the 
First Amendment's protection of a lawyer's freedom of speech. 
Professor Harpaz's basic point is that the heart of a lawyer's work, 
advocacy on behalf of clients, is fully protected by the First Amend-
mentP For this reason, state regulation of a lawyer's choice of cli-
ents amounts to public conscription of that advocacy in violation of 
the lawyer's right to control the message communicated by her 
speech.14 Relying primarily on the Supreme Court's 1995 decision 
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston,15 Professor Harpaz maintains that a lawyer's ideologically 
motivated decision not to represent a client is exempt from scrutiny 
under the antidiscrimination principle because compliance with the 
10. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (1996); Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 41. 
11. Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 41. 
12. See Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech 
Rights of Attorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 49 (1998). 
13. See id. at 63. 
14. See id. at 71. 
15. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
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principle would force the lawyer to alter the ideological message 
she wishes to communicate and because her advocacy, though com-
pelled, might be publicly perceived as entailing her endorsement of 
the altered message. Compulsion of this sort, Professor Harpaz 
concludes, violates the lawyer's First Amendment right to speaker 
autonomy. 
If Professor Harpaz's position would provide a blanket First 
Amendment exemption for all decisions by lawyers to engage in 
otherwise prohibited discrimination in the selection of clients, it 
may be overbroad.16 After all, much of what lawyers do cannot be 
described as public advocacy or even as work in preparation for 
public advocacy. The speaker autonomy interests of a racist or sex-
ist estate planning lawyer may be more analogous to those that 
might be claimed by a similarly disposed accountant (or doctor or 
dentist) than those of a courtroom advocate, and may warrant an 
accordingly lesser degree of First Amendment protection. More 
fundamentally, Professor Harpaz's emphasis on the Hurley deci-
sion's protection of speaker autonomy interests elides the extent to 
which even lawyers' public advocacy may legitimately be con-
strained by the antidiscrimination principle just because it is already 
conscripted-albeit by the market rather than by government. 
In Hurley, the Supreme Court sustained the South Boston Al-
lied War Veterans Council's claim to First Amendment protection 
of its decision to exclude an organization of open gays and lesbians 
from its annual St. Patrick's Day ParadeP As Professor Harpaz 
shows, the Court rested on the "fundamental rule ... that a speaker 
has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message."18 But 
the South Boston Allied War Veterans' Council is an autonomous 
speaker in a way that most lawyers engaged in the private practice 
of law are not. The Council's choice of what public communication 
to make through its sponsorship of the parade was, however nebu-
lous in content, speech that grew exclusively out of the shared asso-
ciational interests of its members.19 There is no suggestion in 
Hurley that the Council's decisions about when, where, or what to 
16. See Harpaz, supra note 12, at 51 (arguing that "the application of the state 
Public Accommodation Statute to a lawyer's ideologically motivated decision not to 
represent a client violates the First Amendment"). But see Deborah L. Rhode, Can a 
Lawyer Insist on Clients of One Gender? NAT'L L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at A21 (suggesting 
that the First Amendment does not protect Nathanson's rejection of Male divorce cli-
ents on the basis of sex). 
17. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581. 
18. Harpaz, supra note 12, at 52 (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573). 
19. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-74. 
98 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:93 
communicate were ever offered for sale to members of the public. 
Most lawyers, even politically committed lawyers like Judith Na-
thanson, obviously cannot make this claim. 
This distinction may justify application of the antidiscrimina-
tion principle to the client selection decisions of many lawyers, even 
though the First Amendment precludes its application to the Vet-
eran's Council's selection of parade participants. First, it suggests 
that a private lawyer whose advocacy on behalf of a particular client 
is coerced by her compliance with the antidiscrimination principle 
may not run a serious risk that the general public will perceive her 
to endorse personally the positions she takes for the client. After 
all, if lawyers' services are a market commodity, they are likely to 
be seen as such by the public. If anything, the public may tend to 
overestimate the extent to which lawyers operate purely as hired 
guns with little personal attachment to the causes they advocate or 
the clients they represent. 
More controversially, speech whose content is itself the consid-
eration in a commercial transaction merits less First Amendment 
protection than speech emerging from other forms of personal asso-
ciation. As Professor Harpaz implies, to the extent legal services 
are seen as a commodity that is analogous, say, to a meal in a res-
taurant,2° they become a more legitimate object of public regula-
tion, at least when the purpose of the regulation is' to ensure that 
the services are available to members of the public on a nondiscrim-
inatory basis. 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees,21 decided in 1984, offers a persuasive description of 
this distinction: 
On the one hand, an association engaged exclusively in pro-
tected expression enjoys First Amendment protection of both the 
content of its message and the choice of its members. Protection 
of the message itself is judged by the same standards as protec-
tion of speech by an individual. Protection of the association's 
right to define its membership derives from the recognition that 
the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a 
voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that 
voice. . . . A ban on specific group voices on public affairs vio-
lates the most basic guarantee of the First Amendment-that cit-
izens, not government, control the content of public discussion. 
20. See Harpaz, supra note 12, at 59. 
21. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
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On the other hand, there is only minimal constitutional pro-
tection of the freedom of commercial association. There are, of 
course, some constitutional protections of commercial speech-
speech intended and used to promote a commercial transaction 
with the speaker. But the State is free to impose any rational 
regulation on the commercial transaction itself. The Constitution 
does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, sup-
pliers, or those with whom one engages in simple commercial 
transactions, without restraint from the State. A shopkeeper has 
no constitutional right to deal only with persons of one sex.22 
99 
Justice O'Connor's account of the disparate reasons for human 
association captures the essence of the conflict between Judith Na-
thanson and the Massachusetts' Public Accommodations Statute. If 
Nathanson is a "shopkeeper" seeking exemption from rational state 
regulation of her commercial transactions, her position is, of course, 
meritless. But if her choice of clients is taken in pursuit of an ex-
pressive association, if her divorce practice is the "creation of a 
voice" with her female clients, then her exclusion of men from that 
expressive association is indeed the definition of the voice she and 
her clients are creating. 
Nathanson's law practice plainly includes elements of the shop-
keeper's calling. Like most other lawyers, and like doctors, den-
tists, accountants, and restauranteurs, she provides a service to 
members of the public for financial consideration in expectation of 
earning a profit. But unlike many other lawyers and most, perhaps 
all, doctors, dentists and restauranteurs, Nathanson, as a feminist 
seeking "to devote her expertise to eliminating gender bias in the 
court system," is, with the female clients she chooses to represent, 
the author of a "specific group voice" entitled to the highest mea-
sure of First Amendment protection. It is this commitment, grow-
ing from the strength and clarity of Nathanson's fusion of personal 
values and professional skills, that provides the strongest argument 
for exempting her refusal to accept male divorce clients from sanc-
tion under the Massachusetts Public Accommodation Statute. 
As a practical matter, it may be objected, it is often impossible 
to separate those lawyers who are "shopkeepers" from those who 
aim to create, with their clients, an associational voice. But Judith 
Nathanson's explanation of her reasons for refusing male divorce 
clients suggests that this obstacle is not as insuperable as it might 
first appear. Recall that Nathanson has no objection to represent-
22. Id. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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ing men in matters which do not themselves involve controversies 
between men and women. Her limited refusal to accept men as 
clients is motivated as much by widely shared professional values as 
by her own commitment to gender justice. If Nathanson is war-
ranted in believing that excluding men as divorce clients enhances 
her own commitment to her female clients, her clients' trust in her, 
and her credibility with judges, then the exclusion is as integral to 
her obligation to represent her clients as effectively as she can as it 
is to her political commitment. 
This direct relationship between Nathanson's refusal to repre-
sent men in divorce cases and the vigorous, effective representation 
of her women clients completes her argument for a First Amend-
ment exemption from the antidiscrimination principle. The linkage 
between the refusal and her professional role is what makes the 
voice Nathanson seeks to create associative, belonging as much to 
her clients as to herself. Moreover, the professional service Na-
thanson provides to the women she represents in divorce cases is 
advocacy of the very message forged by this associative voice. That 
is why, in Justice O'Connor's terms, the right of the association be-
tween Nathanson and her female clients "to define its membership" 
is protected by the First Amendment.23 An estate planning or per-
sonal injury lawyer with a discriminatory preference for white or 
male clients could rarely, if ever, offer either of these justifications 
for exercising that preference. Neither would a client be likely to 
retain an estate or tort lawyer because that lawyer turned away 
other potential clients of a different race or sex. Nor would the 
lawyer's work for such a client ordinarily express or in any way de-
pend on the prejudice that brought them together.24 
23. Id. at 633. 
24. This does not mean that Nathanson's argument could never be asserted by a 
lawyer whose choice of clients is motivated by racial, sexual, religious, or other forms of 
bigotry. A bigoted lawyer's political commitments are fully protected by an indispensa-
ble principle of First Amendment law: That the government may not discriminate 
among citizens on the basis of the viewpoints they hold. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388-96 (1992). But under the argument advanced here, such a law-
yer may invoke the First Amendment as a shield against the application of the antidis-
crimination principle only if his/her discrimination in selecting clients also enhances the 
quality of the legal representation provided to the clients he/she does represent. For 
example, a lawyer, if there is one, whose practice is devoted to furthering the perceived 
common integrity of Aryan, Christian men could refuse representation to Blacks, Jews, 
and women. A racist, sexist, anti-Semitic commercial litigator, however, could not. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination might 
justifiably apply the Public Accommodations Statute to the client 
selection practices of some, perhaps many, lawyers. But it should 
leave Judith Nathanson alone. Nathanson's decision to represent 
only women in divorce cases is protected by the First Amendment, 
not because she is entitled as a lawyer to indulge whatever biases 
she chooses in her selection of clients, but because, as a lawyer of 
integrity who has melded her personal values and professional skills 
in service to the profession's best ideals, she is entitled to represent 
her chosen clients as she sees fit. 
